Abstract
Route Choice (sometimes referred to as Traffic Assignment) describes the process by which travelers 23 going from point A to point B choose by mode M choose routes. Under the assumptions such as that 24 users all care about the same thing (usually taken to be minimizing travel time), route choice problems 25 on networks generally result in a User equilibrium (UE) pattern of traffic, wherein it is to no individual 26 traveler's advantage to change routes if no one else does. User equilibrium is thus an emergent property of 27 individual route choice behavior. We aim to game the equilibrium-finding process. This learning can engage 28 students in the choice decision process, and therefore allows students to experience the equilibration process 29 in person. We hope this pique's their interest in learning and improves their understanding of the underlying 30 equilibrium theory and mathematical formulas involved.
31
When the traffic assignment model is taught, a very important concept needs to be mentioned, the 32 "Braess' paradox" (8), which shows that under certain circumstances adding a new link results in longer 33 total travel time. The System Optimal (SO) route choice pattern minimizes total travel time, and is well-34 known to differ from the UE pattern in many cases (basically because people choose routes based on their 35 Average Cost (AC), but impose a Marginal Cost (MC) on society) in the absence of road pricing. The 36 ratio of UE/SO is often termed the "Price of Anarchy", and is the cost to society due to decentralizing route 37 choice decisions (9) . Braess' paradox illustrates that building more roads might not improve the performance 38 of the total network operation. Braess' paradox is counter-intuitive, so it is not easy for students to truly 39 understand it unless they experience first hand. Moreover, introducing this concept to students in class 40 enriches their understanding of transportation planning, and would definitely help those who will pursue transportation careers after graduation. Many researchers have explored the existence of equilibrium or 42 Braess' Paradox from the behavioral side by letting volunteers to play the multiple-player game ((10-14) ).
43
However, their goal is to study travelers' choice behavior, instead of education. In our study, we will develop 44 a multi-agent route choice game (MARC) to engage students in this well-know phenomenon and to discover 1 this scientific phenomenon through the game. Assimilating (AC/RO), Converging (AC/AE), Accommodating (CE/AE). Students with different learning 6 styles differentially benefit from playing games ((5-7, 15)). In this paper, we explore the role of the learning 7 styles in adopting this interactive multi-agent computer game as an education tool.
8
Summarizing the above goals, research questions we aim to answer here are:
9
• Does a computer game improve students' understanding of traffic assignment and Braess' Paradox?
10
• Is the designed computer game an effective tool in undergraduate transportation engineering courses?
11
• Who benefits more by playing the designed computer game?
12
The rest paper is organized as follows: In Section (2), we will introduce the course background and multi-13 agent route choice game (MARC) we designed. In Section (3), the statistical findings of the game are revealed, 14 based on the case-control and before-after comparisons, to show whether the game will improve students' 15 understanding, whether it is effective in learning, and who benefit more from playing it. In Section (4), 16 students' feedback and comments on the game are presented, to show their direct opinion on incorporating 17 the game as an education tool. In Section (5), the conclusions and lessons are summarized. Minnesota. It is taught every semester, and averages 60 students (more in the Spring, fewer in the Fall).
23
Registered students include sophomores or juniors and some out-of-sequence seniors ((6)).
24
In 2012 spring, 74 students registered this course. This course contained two 2-hour lectures and one 25 computer lab each week. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table ( Before the game was implemented, the four-step transportation planning model was introduced to students,
29
and the route choice model was discussed in detail. The concept of user equilibrium was mentioned. The
30
Braess' Paradox was not part of the syllabus, so students may discover it through the game (it is also not 31 at this time described in the text provided to students http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Fundamentals_ 32 of_Transportation). In order to help students better understand the concepts taught in the lecture, we 33 developed a multi-agent route choice game (MARC)), and our goals are two-fold:
• computer. The terminal computer provides the interface for the player to take the action, and send the data 5 to the server; then the server collects data from each terminal, including the ID and name for each player, The whole game play session lasts for about 40 minutes. At the beginning of the game, every player 1 receives a fixed number of points. After each round, the travel time they experienced will be subtracted from 2 the current score (giving them an incentive to minimize travel time). Whoever has the highest remaining 3 score in the end wins the game.
4
Before and after game playing, students were asked to fill in pre-and post-surveys respectively. In the 5 pre-survey, students' background information and one question related to Braess' Paradox were collected; 6 the post-survey is mainly designed to collect students' opinions about the game and to assess whether their 7 understanding is improved after playing the game. In the following, we will assess our goals by using the 8 data collected from both pre and post surveys. In total 68 students completed both pre-and post-survey. They are divided into two groups: 21 10 students did not play the paradox game, belonging to 'no-play group'; and 47 students have played the 11 game, belonging to 'play group'. (The group that did not play the paradox game during this lab session 12 played it in a subsequent lab session in order to ensure fairness in the course outcome.) Afterwards, all 68 students were given the same networks shown in the game, and were asked to solve the values of either zero or one, the logistic regression is adopted:
where β 0 , β 1 : regression coefficients.
18
The regression coefficients and its goodness-of-fit (analysis of deviance) results are as follows: In the pre-survey, students were asked to fill in their individual learning preferences (see Table ( Active experimentation (doing). These variables are coded binary in regression, "feel=0" means the student 6 does not prefer learning by concrete experience, otherwise.
7
After playing the game, students were asked also to rate the effectiveness of this computer game as a 8 curriculum tool with five scales: 'not effective at all' to 'very effective' (coded from 1 to 5, the greater the 9 value, the more effective computer games are as a curriculum tool) (see Table ( 2)).
10
Our hypothesis is: among those who have played the game, whether the computer game is considered to 11 be an effective learning tool is influenced by students' learning preferences. By inspecting p-value, only 'watch' is significant at 5% level. The interpretation of coefficients in ordinal 26 logistic regression is: For binary variables (i.e., feel/think/do/watch), a one unit increase in watching (i.e., go- Fixing the age (drawing a vertical line at one age point), this line crosses five lines and we will have 2 five probability values, representing the different likelihood levels of effectiveness. The sum of these five 3 probability values should be equivalent to 1. The younger the player is, the higher the probability of 4 effectiveness is; while the older the player is, they are less likely to think this computer game as an effective 5 learning tool.
6
Comparing two subfigures, when a player at the same age prefers reflective observation, the odds of 7 treating this game as effective learning tool is lower, which is reasonable. For those in the stage of reflective 8 observation learning, they do not like exploring a system randomly, and they prefer instructors to give them 9 accurate information they should know and get the right answer to the problem ( (15)). Playing computer 10 games requires them to explore on their own, which makes them feel uncomfortable in learning. In post-survey, students were asked to self evaluate whether their learning regarding the user equilibrium
13
and Braess paradox was enhanced by playing the game with five scales: from 1 to 5 (the greater the value, 14 the more their learning is enhanced) (see Table ( 2)).
15
Our hypothesis test is: among those who have played the game, students' age influences the degree to 16 which they would benefit from the game. categories to the high category) is multiplied by 0.7 (=e −0.3479796 ).
5
Based on the above fitted model, we can predict the probability of enhancing learning level over the age In Figure (7) , the horizontal axis is the age range of players, and the vertical axis is the probability of the learning enhanced by the game. Figure (7) says that, the younger the player is, the higher the probability 9 of their learning is greatly enhanced; while the older the player is, their knowledge will be less likely to be 10 enhanced.
11
4 Students' feedback from the game 1 After playing the game, 47 players were asked to evaluate the game regarding its easiness and effectiveness 2 levels with five scales: from 1 to 5 (the greater the value, the more their learning is enhanced). The results 3 are shown in Table ( 2): the median easiness level is 2, so more than half of players think this game is 4 relatively easy, which matches our goal of design. The median effectiveness level is 3, meaning half students 5 consider this computer game as an effective curriculum tool.
6
In the post-survey, we collected students' feedback about the Braess' Paradox game and their experiences 7 about this game.
8
As an aid in teaching tool of the lecture, this game is "...essential to all students to have a good idea of 9 the equations that we are using and how they are derived...", and this game "helped me understand some This paper introduces the multi-agent route choice game we developed for an undergraduate transportation 29 engineering course, and how it can benefit students' learning about the user equilibrium and Braess' Paradox.
30
The statistical results show that this game supplements the regular lecture, enhances student learning and 31 is an effective education tool.
32
There are still some technical complexities in the game, mainly because it is a multiplayer game instead 33 of stand-alone, Our future goal is to popularize it to web-based game, so that educators from other institutes 34 can access it and apply it more easily to classroom teaching.
35
We would also like to create more scenarios based on this platform. For example, we can present real-time
36
road condition information to players, and see how their reactions are. This will help students to learn how intelligent transportation systems affect drivers' behavior and traffic patterns. Besides, toll charge can be 38 imposed to certain links to help students to understand the role of toll in transportation operation. 
